

for instance Albertus de Saxonia, Perutilis Logica, tr. which are to be considered the better ones.ġ0. The following "nec" is omitted by 21 mss., but is found in at least three mss.

Of the manuscripts examined by us 9 (and the better ones) have "non", 6 "nec", 12 have "ut" (easily mistaken for "nec") the edition has "scilicet" and one ms. Bendiek, O.F.M., in Franzikanische Studien, 32 (1950) 108-109, found that of the 9 manuscripts he has examined only three make sense. Salamucha, Die Aussagenlogik bei Wilhelm Ockham-translated from the Polish by J. The following "not" is very crucial for our interpretation. Many manuscripts, approximately half of the 30 examined by us, read here propositionis instead of propositionum however, their number decreases at the following two occurrences in favor of the reading of the better manuscripts, viz., propositionum. " Dorp in his commentary, however, restores a "sufficit" into the qualification and makes a false conditional proposition equivalent with a modal proposition expressing that it is possible that the antecedent be true and the consequent be false. Ad falsitatem conditionalis requiritur quod antecedens possit esse verum sine consequente, ut: Si Sortes est, Sortes est albus. Unde omnis conditionalis vera est necessaria est enim necessaria consequentia. "Ad veritatem conditionalis requiritur quod antecedens non possit esse verum sine consequente. This is even more strongly expressed in the Summa Logicae falsely ascribed to St. Introductiones in Logicam (München, 1937), p. Consequentia accidentalis est, quae tenet per locum extrinsecum, et sic quando antecedens non includit consequens, sed tenet per quandam regulam extrinsecam.ĥ. 2, in the beginning): Consequentia simplex est duplex, quaedam naturalis, et est quando antecedens includit consequens, et talis consequentia tenet per locum intrinsecum. We read in Burleigh's still unedited De puritate artis logicae (tr.

It seems that this distinction is, though not exactly in the sense Boethius understood it, still found in the distinction between a consequentia naturalis and accidentalis. De Syllogismis hypotheticis, PL 64, 825B.Ĥ. , vel requiritur, quod propositio illa sit prior alia, ita quod praedicatum antecedentis prius praedicetur. Et est sciendum, quod hic accipitur causa large et non stricte non enim requiritur ad veritatem causalis, quod una propositio sit causa, quare alia ponitur in esse, sed sufficit, quod exprimat causam requisitam ad hoc quod alia propositio sit vera. "Three Sums of Logic attributed to William Ockham," in Franciscan Studies XI (1951), 173-193.Ģ.
